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 China’s Official Development Finance Flows 
in Zambia under the Beijing Consensus  
 
IVA SOJKOVÁ∗ 
(University of Hradec Králové) 
 
Abstract 
Chinese development finance flows provided to African recipients have gained a lot of 
attention for their volume and nature, representing an alternative approach to 
development. It is the aim of this article to examine the observance of principles of 
China’s development model, the Beijing Consensus, through China’s Official 
Development Finance delivered to Zambia between 2000 and 2014. Due to a lack of 
information published on development finance flows by the Chinese government, the 
author uses AidData’s dataset, media, and government reports to verify the nature and 
amount of finance flows provided and their allocation in the country. The analysis 
demonstrates that apart from the “non-interference principle”, all the principles are 
observed when their adherence is limited to the purpose of the delivered projects. 
However, their observance is at the same time undercut by characteristics of the process 
of projects’ implementation and their allocation. There are also other Chinese activities 
further undermining the adherence. Although these activities are not directly associated 
with China’s ODF-like finance delivery to Zambia, they influence the successful 
observance of the examined principles in a negative way.  
 
Keywords: China, Africa, development, Beijing Consensus, Zambia.   
 
 
China1 has witnessed unprecedented economic growth since the 
adoption of the economic reforms, 40 years ago. For many contemporary 
developing countries, its example is perceived as an alternative development 
approach that is worth attention not only for its success, but also due to the 
disappointment arising from the acceptance and implementation of Western-
centered models of development experimented under the Washington 
Consensus, which led to the deterioration of economic, social, and political 
conditions in many developing countries. China’s specific development 
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experience triggered a controversial debate concerning the applicability or 
repeatability of its developmental path. This debate was triggered in 2004 when 
Joshua Cooper Ramo published the essay The Beijing Consensus2 focused on 
the development policies and reforms China adopted, as well as on its 
underlying values. Symbolically, just by using the term, Ramo called attention 
to the difference between this model and the model of the Western/Washington 
Consensus, formulated by John Williamson in 1989 and subsequently applied to 
developing countries and countries undergoing economic crises. 
The Beijing Consensus therefore represents an alternative model that is 
appealing for developing countries due to China’s economic success, a country 
that has managed to get hundreds of millions of its inhabitants out of poverty. 
As the African continent consists mainly of developing countries, this approach 
was rapidly perceived as a potential replacement of the Western model of 
development that gained a negative connotation among numerous African 
societies and political leaders, considering its impact on the micro-economic 
level as well as the core values and policies imposed by the donor-countries. 
Since 2000, when the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was 
established,3 it has also been possible to observe a significant growth of Chinese 
involvement in Africa. With this increased interest, the financial flows - which 
can be characterized as Official Development Finance Flows - have been 
growing as well. As a result, between 2000 and 2014, with almost 30% share of 
China’s total development financing, Africa became the second largest recipient 
of these flows, surpassed only by Asia.4 
One of the African countries in which the Chinese presence and interests 
are the most evident is Zambia, a country where the development finance flows 
have reached a total amount of 5.4 billion USD, ranking the country among the 
top recipients on the continent. Because of these substantial investments, 
Zambia is an interesting case to examine as it has been receiving Chinese 
development finance flows quite regularly since the 1960s. This makes it a 
rather rare case in the African context - in most of the African countries, the 
cooperation eventually suffered from political and ideological turmoil resulting 
in a Chinese discontinuous influx of financial flows. Moreover, given this long-
lasting cooperation and support, the outstanding Zambia-China ties are at times 
                                                 
2 
 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2004. 
3
  The emergence of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), founded in 2000, 
represents also the beginning of the timescale in the research, as it can be considered a 
milestone in the relations between China and the African countries. It is this 
institutionalization of cooperation that has led to a significant increase and regularity in 
various Chinese financial flows to the region. The end of the time period is 2014 which is 
given by restrictions on the availability of coherent data on China’s development finance. 
4  The figure was calculated by the author based on the dataset provided by AidData 
available at: http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset (accessed: 9 
October 2017). 
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referred to as “all-weather friends” relationship. In this respect, it is highly 
interesting to analyse the development finance flows in the Zambian case with 
the intent to better understand how these relations have changed after 2000. It is 
hence the objective of this article to evaluate the compliance with China’s 
model of development – the so-called Beijing Consensus (as defined by Ramo) 
– and the evolution of the financial flows provided by the Chinese Official 
Development Finance to Zambia between 2000 and 2014. The research question 
is: Are the suggested principles of the Beijing Consensus observed in the case of 
Zambia during the provision of the Chinese ODF flows and projects? 
There have been numerous publications dealing with the issue of Chinese 
development finance flows in Africa. Among the most significant studies, 
Bräutigam's articles and books stand out5. Her research can be considered, so 
far, to be the most extensive on the issue of China’s development aid, in 
particular in relation to her intention to cover the information gap and to 
challenge some myths concerning China’s involvement in Africa as well as 
China’s specific understanding of what a development aid should includes. 
Among other important studies focused on Chinese development finance flows, 
it is possible to mention a collection of articles edited by Dent6, the volume co-
signed by Davies7 and the research done by Ngaire Woods8. One of the most 
recent studies questioning some myths about Chinese development finance 
flows to Africa is a quantitative research conducted by Axel Dreher et al9. The 
literature addressing the Beijing Consensus or China’s development model 
questions the very existence of the model and its features, if compared to its 
countermodel, the Washington Consensus. Most of these studies multiplied in 
response to the financial crises hitting the world markets in 2008, during which 
the Chinese economy proved to be resilient to these financial fluctuations, 
making the debate and research on China’s development model even more 
                                                 
5 
 Deborah Bräutigam, “China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know?,”, Robert I. 
Rodberg (ed.), China into Africa. Trade, Aid, and Influence, The Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 197-216; Deborah Bräutigam, The dragon's gift: the 
real story of China in Africa, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010; Deborah 
Bräutigam, “Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’: Chinese Foreign Aid and Development 
Finance Meet the OECD‐DAC Aid Regime”, Journal of International Development 23: 5, 
2011, pp. 752-754. 
6  Christopher M. Dent (ed.), China and Africa Development Relations, Routledge, London, 
2010. 
7  Martyn Davies et al., How China delivers development assistance to Africa, Centre for 
Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch, 2008. 
8  Ngaire Woods, “Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent 
revolution in development assistance”, International Affairs 84: 6, 2008, pp. 1205-1221. 
9  Axel Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms 
of State Financing from China to Africa”, Discussion Paper Series, no. 620, 2016, 
http://archiv.ub.uniheidelberg.de/volltextserver/22003/1/dreher_fuchs_Parks_Strange_'Tie
rney_2016_dp620.pdf (accessed 28 September 2017). 
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relevant. In relation to this discussion, one can come across a number of authors 
dealing with the Beijing Consensus and China’s peculiar economic growth, 
most of which present the Chinese model as a potential threat to the dominance 
of the United States and its liberal-democratic model10. Other scholars described 
the model as an opportunity and a better alternative for developing regions11. In 
this article, different critical analyses are discussed in order to illustrate the 
possible weaknesses and strengths of Ramo’s ideas12. The critical debate that 
emerged as a reaction to Ramo’s concept points out to some troublesome 
aspects of his thoughts concerning the very existence of the model and the 
applicability of its principles or even the originality of China’s development 
path suggested by Ramo when the concept is compared to the Washington 
Consensus. 
The main contribution of this article to the debate lies in its endeavor to 
go beyond the prevailing theoretical discussion and examine its applicability 
empirically within a specific case study, Zambia. Note should be taken that 
some of the models’ features have been addressed within some of the 
aforementioned studies on China’s engagement in Africa (e.g., the non-
                                                 
10
  Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, “China’s illiberal challenge”, Democracy: A Journal of 
Ideas 2: Fall, 2006, pp. 56-68; Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age”, Foreign 
Affairs 88: 3, 2009, pp. 40–56; Stefan A. Halper, The Beijing Consensus, How China's 
Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, Basic Books, New York, 
2010; Clyde Prestowitz, The Betrayal of American Prosperity: Free Market Delusions, 
America’s Decline, and How We Must Compete in the Post-Dollar Era, Free Press, New 
York, 2010; Ziya ÖNIŞ, “The Age of Anxiety: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy in a 
Post-Hegemonic Global Order”, The International Spectator 52: 3, 2017, pp. 18-35. 
11
  Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus... cit.; Chris Colley, “China’s reforms at 30 
and the ‘Beijing Consensus’”, Pambazuka News, China-Africa Watch section, issue 417, 
31 January 31, https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/china%E2%80%99s-reforms-
30-and-%E2%80%9Cbeijing-consensus%E2%80%9D (accessed 1 February 2018); 
Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the 
End of the Western World, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 2009; Xin LI, Kjeld Erik 
Brødsgaard, and Michael Jacobsen, “Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic 
principles”, China Economic Journal 2: 3, 2010, pp. 297-311. 
12
  Arif Dirlik, “Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi.’Who Recognizes Whom and to What 
End?”, Position Paper, Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium, 
https://www.ids-uva.nl/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/9_Dirlik1.pdf (accessed 
13 March 2018); Max Rebol, “Why the Beijing Consensus is a Non-Consensus: 
Implications for Contemporary China-Africa Relations”, Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the 
Centre for East-West Cultural & Economic Studies 9: 1, 2010, pp. 7-20; Scott Kennedy, 
“The Myth of the Beijing Consensus”, Journal of Contemporary China 19: 65, 2010, pp. 
461-47; Barry Naughton, “China's distinctive system: can it be a model for others?”, 
Journal of Contemporary China, 19: 65, 2010, pp. 437-460; Shaun Breslin, „The ‘China 
Model’ And the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?”, 
International Affairs 87: 6, 2011, pp. 1323-1343; Matt Ferchen, “Whose China Model is it 
anyway? The contentious search for consensus”, Review of International Political 
Economy 20: 2, 2013, pp. 390-420. 
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interference principle or the impact of China’s engagement on the 
environment). However, most of these studies only rarely focused on the 
specific debate on China’s model of development13 and the research on its 
applicability on the Zambian case is absent. To cover this gap, an instrumental 
case study is used to analyse the Chinese development finance flows through 
the observance of its core-principles: the innovation-led development, social 
development, sustainable development, non-interference in the internal affairs 
of another state, and the principle of stability. For each of these principles, the 
study examines the delivery of specific projects supporting its compliance. 
Other activities and engagement of China in Zambia are also analysed in the 
cases where they are considered to have a potential influence on the compliance 
with its core-principles. The conclusions drawn are then evaluated in order to 
understand the extent to which the Beijing Consensus applies in Zambia. This 
method allows us to thoroughly analyse detailed data and information on the 
project level in order to understand the nature of the delivered projects and the 
characteristics of China’s engagement in Zambia.  
When dealing with the topic of China’s development finance flows, one 
can come across several obstacles that need to be faced. The major one is the 
lack of officially provided transparent data on the project level, data that would 
give the researcher the much needed specific information on the nature and the 
development potential of the financial flows, and, above all, that would also 
confirm the very existence of the projects and their allocation. Therefore, in 
order to deal with the research question, the information is drawn primarily 
from newspaper articles dealing with the topic of development finance flows 
provided by China. These articles were published mainly in Zambia or in China. 
However, Chinese media are rarely referred to as they are considered less 
reliable and are used just to confirm the very existence of a specific project. 
Other complementary sources have been included: government and NGOs 
reports and statements as well as research articles published on China’s 
engagement in Zambia. Although in recent years, some efforts have been made 
to deal with this data gap (White Papers on development aid were published in 
201114 and 201415), the available information remaines too vague and only very 
limited research has relied on it. To note also the Beijing’s rejection of the 
international regime for the provision of development finance flows, as defined 
by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
                                                 
13  Iva Sojková, “The Beijing Consensus: Characteristics of China’s Official Development 
Finance in Ghana, 2000–2013” Central European Journal of International and Security 
Studies 11: 3, 2017, pp. 107-140. 
14  The State Council of the PRC, “China’s Foreign Aid”, 2011, http://english.gov.cn/ 
archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm (accessed 9 October 
2017). 
15  Ibidem. 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC). This represents an additional 
obstacle for the classification of the Chinese financial flows. China argues that 
South-South cooperation is qualitatively different and should therefore not be 
determined by traditional principles of finance provision and, consequently, 
considers that the principle of transparency should apply only to North-South 
cooperation.16 However, some efforts have been made to address this data gap. 
So far, the most ambitious project was launched in 2013 by the AidData 
organization. AidData responds to the demand for more accurate data on the 
project level and openly addresses the issue of data complexity and the 
possibility to classify Chinese development finance flows as defined by the 
OECD. With respect to the OECD’s classification of ODF17, it recognizes 
several classes China’s ODF flows are split into: “ODA-like”, “OOF-like”, and 
a class labelled “Vague Official Finances”, a category that includes finance 
impossible to identify in a precise manner due to the lack of information about 
its development potential.18 In this article, the classification and calculations 
related to the projects are based on the data collected and published under the 
AidData initiative. The financial flows are labelled in accordance to the 
AidData classification.19  
The article concludes that, putting aside the non-interference in the 
internal affairs of another state principle, a principle that was clearly breached 
                                                 
16  Mark Tran, “Transparency Could Be the Sticking Point for China at Busan”, The 
Guardian, November 14, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/ 
2011/nov/14/busan-aid-china-rejects transparency (accessed 19 October 2017). 
17  Official Development Finance is used for measuring the inflow of resources to recipient 
countries and includes: (a) bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA), (b) grants 
and concessional and non-concessional development lent by multilateral financial 
institutions, and (c) Other Official Flows (OOF) for development purposes (including 
refinancing loans) which have too low a grant element to qualify as ODA. Specifically, 
ODA is defined according to the OECD as “grants or loans to countries and territories on 
the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies 
which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic 
development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a 
loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, 
technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes 
are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g., pensions, reparations or 
insurance pay-outs) are in general not counted.” (OECD- DAC, “Glossary of Key Terms 
and Concepts”, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm (accessed 19 October 2017)). 
Development finances classified as OOF are defined as “transactions by the official sector 
with countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients which do not meet the conditions for 
eligibility as Official Development Assistance, either because they are not primarily 
aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25 per cent”. 
Ibidem. 
18  Austin Strange et al., “China's development finance to Africa: A media-based approach to 
data collection”, Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 323, 2013, pp. 15. 
19  All amounts concerning the development financing that were calculated by the author are 
provided in the US dollars with inflation rate of 2014. 
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during the 2006 election, all principles were met when the observance was 
limited to financial and project delivery phases. However, their compliance 
depends on the characteristics of the process of projects’ implementation and 
allocation. Some of the projects and finance flows have been criticized for their 
quality and sustainability.  The analysis provided takes into account the broad 
criticisms characterizing China’s engagement in Zambia after the 2000s. 
However, there have been some cases in which the legitimacy and unbiasedness 
of the accusations against China could be at least contested. This poses a 
question on the extent of China’s real negative influence, an element that has 
been quite frequently presented in Zambia and abroad by the media and 
different politicians.  
 
 
The Beijing Consensus 
Short Discussion and Operationalization of the Concept 
 
The controversial debate about the Chinese model of development began 
as a response to the publication of Ramo's analysis in 2004. The scholar used 
the term “Beijing Consensus” to describe the uniqueness of the Chinese 
development approach, a model that differs from the Western one – the 
“Washington Consensus” – presented by John Williamson in 1989. Williamson 
created a list of rules of neoliberal policy for economic reform in Latin 
America, which, as he expected, Washington-based institutions and policy 
makers would agree on. Individual policies emphasized the role of the market 
and the limited role of the state. This model was later presented as universally 
applicable for developing countries facing an economic crisis. In the case of the 
African states, loans were provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank when a given country acceded to the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs). The impact of SAPs imposition on African countries was 
vast and ubiquitous as by 1993, virtually all sub-Saharan Africa states had been 
obliged to implement adjustment programmes. On the population level, such 
poverty expansion was indicated by inaccessible basic public services that 
became, due to budget cuts, privatization, lower incomes, and higher taxes, 
largely unaffordable. The situation resulted in a spread of illiteracy and 
worsening quality of lives.20 In this regard, Zambia was not an exception.21 
                                                 
20  Ross P. Buckley, “The Rich Borrow and the Poor Repay: The Fatal Flaw in International 
Finance”, World Policy Journal 19: 4, 2002, p. 62.  
21
  Neo Simutanyi, “The politics of structural adjustment in Zambia”, Third World Quarterly 
17: 4, 1996, pp. 825-839; William Easterly, “IMF and World Bank structural adjustment 
programs and poverty”, in Michael P. Dooley, Jeffrey A. Frankel (eds.), Managing 
currency crises in emerging markets. University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 361-392; 
William Easterly, “What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and 
growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans”, Journal of development 
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Such a negative experience of many developing countries contributed to the 
popularity of China’s development approach, which was seen as free from 
imposed neoliberal development policies and free from the history of adoption 
of such policies in China.22 
Ramo assumes that the increasing importance of China has not only 
changed the international order but also created a new model upon which other 
states can build their own development. It assumes that the model of the 
Chinese transformation is attractive to those states that are trying to figure out 
the way to develop themselves, their place in the international system in the 
attempt to remain independent and to maintain their own way of life, as well as 
the ability to make their own political decisions. In this regard, Ramo believes 
that the Beijing Consensus replaces the Washington Consensus as an already 
discredited “Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations how to 
run themselves”. Symbolically, Ramo labels it as “a hallmark of end-of-history 
arrogance.”23 According to Ramo, China’s model of development is flexible 
enough that it can hardly be classified as a doctrine: “it does not believe in 
uniform solutions for every situation.”24 It can be defined as an effort to 
innovate and experiment, to maintain national borders and interests. It is a 
model that arose after the reign of Deng Xiaoping and follows the pragmatic 
ideas of that time in which the best path for modernization could be described as 
one of “groping for stones to cross the river” instead of trying to cross the river 
in one great leap of shock therapy.25 Ramo himself points out that China’s 
development path as well as its path to power cannot be repeated by another 
nation. However, some elements of China’s rise relate to the developing world 
and therefore the Beijing Consensus already represents and gives rise to new 
ideas that are very different from those of the West. The Beijing Consensus, just 
like the Washington Consensus before it, includes notions that concern not only 
the economic dimension, but also the political one, as well as the ones related to 
quality of life and the global balance of power.26 Ramo explains the Beijing 
Consensus as the result of three core-theorems about how to organise the place 
of a developing country in the world. More precisely, he refers to: 
 
1. Innovation-led development 
The first theorem argues that the Chinese path of development stems 
from innovations and technological leaps. It is the innovation-led growth that 
was able to keep the Chinese economy growing and helped it to offset the 
                                                                                                                       
economics 76: 1, 2005, pp. 1-22; James Ferguson, Global shadows: Africa in the 
neoliberal world order, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2006. 
22  Chris Alden, “China in Africa. Partner, Competitor, or Hegemon?”, Zed Books, London 
and New York, 2007, p. 20. 
23  Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus…cit., p. 4. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibidem, p. 5. 
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disastrous internal imbalances. The innovation and acquisition of new 
technologies led to rapid change in some sectors which then solved the 
problems arising from the reforms, and contributed to the creation of stable 
environment. This change is based on knowledge. It is therefore necessary for 
the state to invest in education both through the construction of educational and 
research centres, and by attracting experts from abroad. Innovative society 
creates an environment within which experimentation and failures are 
acceptable, leading to productive economic dynamics and allowing substantial 
economic sectors to be gradually transformed according to the needs and to be 
able to survive the development shocks.27 
 
2. Sustainable and equitable development environment 
The second theorem argues that China does not focus only on economic 
growth, but also on a fair distribution of wealth where the benefits are widely 
shared in society. Ramo points out that for Chinese leaders and local officials, 
sustainable and balanced growth became of major concern. It is believed that an 
egalitarian environment and emphasis on redistribution of resources in society 
and improvement of the quality of life of citizens can prevent the society from 
experiencing the chaos that may occur as a result of development changes. 
Likewise, Ramo highlights at this point the efforts to reduce the negative 
impacts on the environment resulting from economic growth and the importance 
of creating a stable environment, which is a prerequisite for development.28 
 
3. The right to self-determination of China and other countries in relation 
to the United States 
This element of the Beijing Consensus refers to the ability to maintain 
control over own development policies and development paths, as well as to the 
success of the Chinese development, which has become a challenge for the 
United States both because of the growing power of China and because the 
model has become attractive to other developing countries. Ramo argues that 
Beijing did not follow the strict policies of the Washington Consensus, but 
rather implemented reforms that better match local conditions and 
circumstances. The developing world sees China as an economic partner and 
political ally representing an alternative development model that further 
contributes to the erosion of the US global dominance.29 
 
                                                 
27  Ibidem, pp. 15-20. 
28  Ibidem, pp. 21-24. 
29  Ibidem, pp. 37-42.  
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The introduction of Ramo’s Beijing Consensus led to broad critiques 
from a number of scholars. Some authors30, for instance, question the very term 
of the “Beijing Consensus”, as no one agrees on anything in Beijing thus the 
term “consensus” inaccurately describes the way policies that led to the Chinese 
development arose. Rebol31 then argues that the Beijing Consensus does not aim 
to be imposed as a development model, which is why it should be seen a 
passive development model that can inspire policies of other states voluntarily. 
This aspect brings the model in opposition to the Western active model that 
imposes its sets of rules upon developing countries in order to be implemented. 
Given the Beijing Consensus’s passivity, however, it is difficult to implement 
the model in a different environment. Moreover, when the two development 
models are compared point by point, there is little difference between the 
Chinese development experience and the Washington Consensus principles. 
China, for instance, maintained relative fiscal discipline throughout tax base 
expansion, and public expenditures have been reoriented toward public good. 
Other similarity is evident in the deregulation of prices and privatisation of its 
state-owned companies. Property rights were also enhanced, and market entry 
and exit barriers were eased. China also embraced international trade and FDI, 
while maintaining a competitive exchange rate.32 
Some scholars then also question the very principles of the development 
model as stated by Ramo. Kennedy at this point underlines the troublesome 
theorem on the role of innovation in development, as China did not develop 
primarily through innovation and thus managed to skip several generations of 
technology and cannot be perceived as a leader in this field, although innovation 
played a role in its development. With an open-door policy, China was able to 
attract a number of investors from abroad who brought along with their 
businesses also new technology into China. In this regard, China did not 
become an innovator, but rather took advantage of these foreign imported 
technologies that also brought valuable knowledge and experience. Even today, 
although China exports the latest technology, it is not manufactured and 
invented solely by Chinese companies, but rather by companies that are either 
jointly owned by Chinese and foreign co-owners, or that are foreign altogether, 
only using beneficial Chinese conditions for manufacturing their products. 33 
Similarly, Dirlik34 underlines that Ramo does not discuss the role of cheap 
labour that attracts foreign investors that are consequently bringing the newest 
                                                 
30
  Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus...cit”, p. 462; Barry Naughton, 
“China’s distinctive system…cit”, pp. 437-438. 
31  Max Rebol, “Why the Beijing Consensus is a Non-Consensus…cit”, p. 18. 
32  Matt Ferchen, “Whose China Model is it anyway?...cit”, p. 394. 
33  Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus…cit”, p. 462. 
34  Arif Dirlik, “Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi.’…cit”, p. 3. 
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technologies. However, as Ortmann35 points out, China is increasingly trying to 
focus on the area of innovation as the next stage of growth and although some 
entrepreneurs have achieved a great deal of improvement in this field, it is still a 
very difficult step in the development of the country, as it takes place in a very 
closed system. 
Similarly, Kennedy also questions Ramo’s theorem about the suggested 
sustainability of China’s development and therefore the respect for the 
environment. China made efforts to minimize the impact of the rapid 
development on the environment. However, proposals on this issue were never 
successfully implemented, since China has always been giving priority to 
development over environmental considerations. Kennedy also perceives 
Ramo’s point concerning the equity of growth as a weakness, implying that 
development brings benefits to the entire population. Even though China did 
manage to get hundreds of million people out of poverty, at the same time, the 
rapid development has led to increasing inequality – personal, sectorial, and 
regional – one cannot therefore think of the reform as being without losers. 
However, Kennedy admits in this regard that social justice is one of the future 
goals of development policies in China.36 Similarly, Dirlik questions the 
theorem claiming that not all Chinese shared the equality during the 
development and Ramo fails to address such a marginalization by development 
policies.37 Indeed, as Breslin38 puts it, when Ramo writes about the 
characteristics of the Beijing Consensus, such as innovation and commitment to 
equitable growth, they should be seen as something that the government wants 
its development strategy to achieve in the future, rather than a summary of what 
has already taken place. Thus, the Beijing Consensus remains in many respects 
an aspiration rather than today’s reality. 
Despite such critiques, the Beijing Consensus concept as presented by 
Ramo has fueled a mix of excitement and worries inspired by China’s booming 
economy and its rapidly expanding global economic and political influence. 
Regardless of the way in which China has managed to develop from an 
underdeveloped country in a very short period of time, for other developing 
countries, this short path to success remains a very attractive example. It should 
be added that the presentation of the Beijing Consensus as an alternative 
development model witnessed a large increase in attention in recent years 
mainly due to the economic crisis, which highlighted the weaknesses of market 
fundamentalism and conversely stressed the importance of government 
regulation and a strong state. In this context, it is important to note that Beijing 
itself is aware of this fact. Although there is a debate about whether China has 
                                                 
35  Stephan Ortmann, “The ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the ‘Singapore model’: Unmasking the 
Myth of an Alternative Authoritarian State-capitalist Model”, Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies 10: 4, 2012, p. 340. 
36  Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus…cit”, p. 470. 
37  Arif Dirlik, “Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi’…cit.”, p. 4. 
38  Shaun Breslin, ‘“The ‘China Model’ And the …”, p. 1331. 
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ever perceived and labelled its development experience as a model that could be 
replicated and given the fact that the idea of the Beijing Consensus as a 
development model did not originate in China, some of its steps suggest such 
awareness. As pointed out by Halper39, in response to the global economic 
crisis, a new ambitious project arose and served to draw attention to the 
existence and importance of China’s alternative model of development and 
economic success. It is an attempt to create a network of Beijing’s foreign offices or 
branches, which will present the modern face of China in every country in the 
world. The emergence of this project was a response to the global economic 
crisis and was used as a platform for criticism of capitalism and the presentation 
of the “Chinese model” as a counterpart of the Western model that led to the 
crises. Through the media, the Chinese government has pointed to the failure of 
free-market fundamentalism, which only emphasized the superiority of the 
Chinese way of development during the presidency of Hu Jinatao, bearing the 
name of scientific development theory. This is the official name for the policy 
advocated by the ruling party that stressed the promotion of the welfare of the 
population, which is strictly controlled by the government from the centre, in 
other words, it represents a policy promoting the idea of state capitalism. 
Based on Ramo’s theorems of the Beijing Consensus, the following 
principles for the case study observance are introduced: 
(1) The principle of innovation-led development emphasizes the 
importance of acquisition of technology and transfer of knowledge in 
development through financial, material, and staff support, in educational and 
research projects in the country. It is examined if the principle is observed 
through the projects supporting the principle whether directly by their very 
purpose or indirectly as a by-product. 
(2) The principle of social development. Within this principle, it is 
analysed if the Chinese development finance flows address and support 
development of social infrastructure in the recipient’s country through 
providing finances for projects within the sector. It is also the concern to find 
out whether this principle is observed during the projects’ implementation 
process, thus potentially improving the quality of life of recipients’ inhabitants 
and if the projects implemented are not concentrated in one area in the country, 
and are allocated equally reaching the poorest regions.  
(3) The principle of sustainable development. Under this principle, the 
attention is paid to the projects that are related to improving the recipient’s 
environment with their very purpose. Thus, projects directly aimed at protecting 
the environment, renewable sources, and carbon emission reduction are grouped 
within this category. It is also of interest to examine if the implementation does 
not degrade the recipient’s environment through potentially harmful and locally 
inappropriate technology used, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
                                                 
39  Stefan A. Halper, The Beijing Consensus…cit., pp. 10-11. 
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(4) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another 
state. The non-interference principle is a traditional element of Chinese foreign 
policy and the principle generally means that a country shall not interfere or 
intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, which come under domestic 
jurisdiction.40 In this regard, it is monitored whether China forces the recipient 
to adopt political and economic reforms in exchange for its development 
finance provision that would consequently lead to violation of recipient’s 
sovereignty. It is monitored whether there are projects whose implementation 
and existence are conditioned by acceptance of Chinese interests that force the 
recipient to implement political and economic reforms and thus create 
favourable environment for their delivery.41  
(5) The principle of stability. This principle works on the assumption of 
stability as a prerequisite for any development to take place. It is assumed that 
China aims to support stable environment in the concerned countries, enhancing 
the state capacity to control the development and, at the same time, to mitigate 
the negative impact development can bring to a developing country. The 
observance of the principle is explored through monitoring possible protests 
concerning the Chinese projects implementation and the recipient’s capacity to 
manage its fiscal obligations to the international creditors with further debt 
burden to China. Under this principle, purposes of projects aiming at enhancing 
stability and peace in the country are examined. This concerns the cases where 
China supports the implementation of projects that are aimed at strengthening 
the security and capacity of the state institutions in the country. 
 
 
The Case Study of Zambia 
 
The Chinese-Zambian bilateral relations have been established since the 
independence of Zambia in 1964. These ties survived ideological as well as 
political changes in Zambia and China, and have remained friendly until the 
new millennium. Such extraordinary stable relations were strongly influenced 
by a specific situation in Zambia. In the 1960s and the 1970s, Zambian 
government had to deal with an unstable geopolitical area considering that a 
white minority hostile to independence movements ruled neighboring countries 
- Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In this geopolitical context, Zambia’s 
main trade routes were blocked and, starting with the 1960s, Zambia requested 
international assistance for the construction of an alternative road to Dar es 
Salaam, through the neighboring Tanzania. However, these requests were 
                                                 
40  Zheng Chen, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle”, The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 9: 3, 2016, p. 351. 
41  In this context, only one official condition still remains: the delivery of development 
finance from China concerns only the states that do not maintain diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan. 
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denied with the argument that the project was not economically feasible. In the 
end, it was Beijing who agreed to build a two thousand-kilometer-long railway - 
the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). Since 1967, the year when 
TAZARA construction started, further development finance flows from the 
PRC followed, including loans and grants mainly for the development of 
Zambia’s infrastructure, as well as staffing in healthcare or scholarships to 
Zambian students. Unlike other cases of African states, this development 
financing has not been interfered by internal political changes and became 
relatively constant.42 In this respect, from 1967 to 1996, up to 35 development 
projects implemented by China can be counted in Zambia. The total amount of 
this aid exceeded 370 million USD, but more specific information from this 
period is missing and the accurate volume of finance delivered can only be 
estimated.43 In return for Beijing’s support, Zambia provided political support to 
the PRC in international institutions as the legitimate representative of China.44 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, as elsewhere on the 
continent, Chinese financial flows have been rapidly growing, reaching 5.4 
billion USD in 2014 (see figure 1). However, with the growing Chinese 
engagement in the country, the long-lasting all-weather friendship between the 
two countries has started to deteriorate.  
 
 
Figure 1: Chinese ODF-like flows to Zambia, 2000 – 201445 
                                                 
42  Frederick Mutesa, “China and Zambia: between development and politics”, in Fantu 
Cheru and Cyril Obi (eds.), The rise of China and India in Africa Challenges, 
Opportunities and Critical Interventions, Zed Books, London, 2010, p. 169. 
43  Chilufya Chileshe, “Chinese Debt, Aid and Trade: Opportunity or Threat for Zambia?”, Occasional Paper, no. 
72. SAIIA, 2010, p. 7, https://www.google.cz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd =1&cad 
=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAAahUKEwjSs5Gu2o3GAhXBvBQKHelWACw&url= 
http%3A%2F% 2Fwww.saiia.org.za%2Fdoc_download%2F73-chinese-debt-aid-and-trade 
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
44  Frederick Mutesa, “China and Zambia: between development….cit.”, pp. 167–168. 
45  The graph includes only the examples of Chinese financing that have not been labelled as 
“cancelled”. Thus, the author includes project statuses on the level of pledge, commitment, 
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The observance of the first principle is supported by projects that can be 
mainly classified under the social infrastructure sector. Thus, in the period 
under review, the PRC provided scholarships to Zambian students, as for 
instance in 2007, to enhance their knowledge in the fields of medicine, IT, 
international business, or agriculture at universities in China.46 However, the 
main progress in this regard was made several years later. In 2013, different 
initiatives in the sector of education could be observed. In 2013, an agreement 
was signed on provision of scholarships for up to 60 Zambian students every 
year.47 The same year Chinese embassy co-financed a project of reconstruction 
of one of the campuses of University of Zambia.48 In 2014, the construction of 
the Confucius Institute branch co-funded by China was also completed at this 
university.49 During this time period, the number of constructed facilities 
remained rather small. As in 2007, only a single project - building two rural 
schools - can be noticed.50 In the case of Zambia, it became evident that China 
is more keen on paying attention to scholarship provisions as a way to support 
knowledge transfer in the educational sector.  
In the health sector, there were several projects delivered that can be 
considered as supporting the principle’s observance. The cost of the 
implemented projects within this sector exceeded the amount of 230 million 
USD.51 Among the initiatives supporting this principle, several types need to be 
mentioned: a regular provision of medical teams from China to health facilities 
in Zambia,52 as well as several technology transfers53 including supporting the 
                                                                                                                       
suspension, implementation and completion.  Figures are calculated based on the dataset 
provided by AidData available at: http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-
dataset (accessed 20 October 2017). 
46´ Gov.cn., “Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. 25 Zambian 
students win Chinese gov't-provided scholarships”, 22 August 2007, http://www.gov.cn/ 
english/2007-08/22/content_724153.htm (accessed 20 October 2017). 
47  Office of the President of the Republic of Zambia, “China Investment Coming”, 2013, 
http://www.statehouse.gov.zm/en/china-investment-coming/ (accessed 20 October 2017). 
48  Shamaoma Musonda, “Zambia: UNZA Fundraises for Library Project”, AllAfrica, 22 
November 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201311230161.html (accessed 20 October 
2017). 
49  Confucius Institute at University of Zambia, “Chinese Vice President Attended 
Groundbreaking Ceremony for Confucius Institute Building at UNZA, Students’ Singing 
Chinese Songs Won Applause”, 2014, http://ci-unza.zm.chinesecio.com/en/node/212 
(accessed 20 October 2017). 
50  Martyn Davies et al., How China delivers development …cit., p. 50. 
51  The amount calculated by the author based on data provided by AidData available at: 
http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset (accessed 20 October 2017). 
52
  Chomba Musika, “28 Chinese Doctors Jet”, The Lusaka Times, 28 November  2011, 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2011/11/28/28-chinese-doctors-jet/ (accessed 20 October 
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establishment of mobile hospital facilities to get health care to remote areas54 
and an equipment provision to antimalarial centre in Lusaka.55 More recently, it 
is possible to mention an expansion of one of Lusaka’s hospitals including 
provision of high-tech equipment.56 
Likewise, projects focused on the transfer of knowledge were also 
implemented in the sector of agriculture. The Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Center was constructed to increase agricultural production in 
Zambia - trainings, research cooperation and technology transfers were 
provided between University of Zambia and Chinese Jilin Agricultural 
University.57 Similarly, in the communication sector, some projects supported 
from China contributed to the principle of compliance. The PRC has delivered 
equipment to these sectors on several occasions and the overall volume of 
finance exceeded 85 million USD58 between 2000 and 2014. In particular, 
initiatives aimed at upgrading facilities utilized in media are worth mentioning.59  
Beijing also pays attention to projects that have been implemented decades 
ago but are still a visible manifest of its engagement. One of the best-known 
projects of this kind is clearly TAZARA. During the given time period, China 
delivered 140 million USD60 in support of the project, including the 
                                                                                                                       
2017) and “Chinese medical team conducts 1,500 surgeries”, in Zambia Daily Mail 
Limited, April 29, 2017, https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/chinese-medical-team-conducts-
1500-surgeries/ (accessed: 20 October 2017). 
53  To wit “Chinese Government to Donate Medical Equipment to Kitwe Hospital”, in 
AllAfrica, 20 May 2005, http://allafrica.com/stories/200505230923.html (accessed 20 
October 2017) and Davies M. M. Chanda, “China to Restock Levy Mwanawasa 
Hospital”, AllAfrica, 23 January  2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300603.html 
(accessed 20 October 2017). 
54 
  “Zambia Mobile Hospitals Service Chongwe Week Pictures”, ukzambians, 4 April 2011, 
http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2011/04/03/zambia-mobile-hospitals-service-chongwe-
week-pictures/ (accessed 25 October 2017). 
55
  “Zambia, China Sign Three Economic Agreements”, in The Lusaka Times, 29 December 
2011, www.lusakatimes.com/2011/12/29/zambiachina-sign-economic-agreements/ 
(accessed 25 October 2017). 
56
  “China commits $90 million to Levy Mwanawasa Hospital Expansion”, The Lusaka 
Times, 31 March 2015, www.lusakatimes.com/2015/03/31/china-commits-90-million-to-
levy-mwanawasa-hospital-expansion/ (accessed 25 October 2017). 
57  Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Zambia, “The China-Aided Agricultural 
Technology Demonstration Centre in Zambia Commissioned”, 2011, 
http://zm2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanews/201106/20110607608477.shtml (accessed 
25 October 2017). 
58  Figures are calculated based on the dataset provided by AidData available at: 
http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset (accessed 25 October 2017). 
59  Ruth Banda, “China Gives Country FM Transmitters”, in AllAfrica, 7 June 2001, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200106070433.html (accessed 25 October 2017). 
60  The overall figures of the projects related to TAZARA concern not only Zambia but also 
financial support to Tanzania due to geographical characteristics of the facility. Amount 
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maintenance of TAZARA and transfer of equipment.61 Significant financial 
support of the railway seems to continue also after 2014.62 
The aforementioned projects can be seen as supporting the principle of the 
innovation-led development. However, in other sectors, its compliance is very 
limited or even absent. Rarely is it possible to come across a transfer of 
knowledge element during the project construction, as it happened for instance 
in 2011 when the PRC provided a team of experts that would train local 
personnel on maintaining the newly constructed stadium in Ndola.63 The 
principle adherence also came into question due to the debatable quality of the 
Chinese expertise. Complaints of this kind concerned the construction of a road 
between Lusaka and Chirundu, which was damaged during the rainy season and 
demanded further repairs. Moreover, the damage followed previous repairs 
delivered by the Chinese company Heinan.64 The damaged road also became 
presented as a part of a narrative about harmful Chinese activities in Africa. As 
reported by The Economist in 2011, “the Chinese-built road from Lusaka, 
Zambia’s capital, to Chirundu in the south-east, was quickly swept away by 
rains.”65 However, the reality significantly differed from the exaggerated report. 
As noted in short article written by Bräutigam (2011)66 and especially in 
Bracht’s study (2012)67, the extent of the road damage was overstated by the 
media, as it was not a 130-km part that was swept away, but just a small 100-
metre section of the road. Bracht offered the views of local experts who 
                                                                                                                       
calculated by the author based on the data provided by AidData, available at: 
http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset (accessed: 25 October 2017). 
61
  Oseph Mwamunyange. “Tazara Gets $5 Million Worth of Equipment”, in Higbeam 
Business, 2006, https://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-153541776/tazara-gets-
5-million-worth-equipment (accessed 25 October 2017) and Ren Zhongxi, “Chinese Vice 
President hands over new equipment to Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority”, in Cntv.cn, 
26 June 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/26/ARTI1403741289184836.shtml 
(accessed 25 October 2017). 
62
  “China to inject $ 376 million in Tazara”, in The Lusaka Times, 20 May 2016, 
www.lusakatimes.com/2016/05/20/china-inject-376-million-tazara/ (accessed 25 October 
2017). 
63  
“China to Train Locals in Stadium Maintenance”, in AllAfrica, 20 August 2011, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201108220941.html (accessed 25 October 2017). 
64
  “Rains Damage Lusaka Chirundu Road”, in The Lusaka Times, 20 March 2009, 
www.lusakatimes.com/2009/03/20/rains-damage-lusaka-chirundu-road/ (accessed 25 
October 2017). 
65  
 “Trying to pull together”, The Economist, 20 April 2011, 
www.economist.com/node/18586448 (accessed 25 October 2017). 
66  Deborah Bräutigam, “Lusaka-Chirundu Road and Summer Research”, China Africa Real 
Story, 25 April 2011, www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/04/lusaka-chirundu-road-and-
summer.html (accessed 25 October 2017). 
67  Gérard van Bracht, “A survey of Zambian views on Chinese People and their involvement 
in Zambia. Centre for Chinese Studies”, African East-Asia Affairs, no 1, 2012, pp. 54–97. 
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similarly refused such criticism, pointing out that because of the heavy rains, the 
damage to the road cannot be considered the fault of the Chinese contractor.  
Additionally, further observance of the principle is - in the case of 
Zambia - undermined by the situation in which the Chinese companies 
implement the majority of the projects and inclusion of recipient’s firms seems 
to be very limited. This can be applied especially to the most financially 
demanding construction of economic infrastructure projects. The lack of 
involvement of the domestic companies can also be demonstrated at one of the 
most visible initiatives in Zambia – Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) constructed in Chambishi in 2007 and in East 
Lusaka in 2009. The creation of special economic zones (SEZs) was crucial for 
China’s domestic development and its early economic reforms implemented in 
the late 1970s. The SEZs thus represent a feature of China’s development path 
that is now exported to Africa.68 However, considering the criteria of project 
selection for this article, this initiative cannot be considered a part of the ODF-
like flows due to the way of financing SEZs’ implementation69, so even 
AidData does not include the construction among the projects implemented 
under the ODF-like flows. Nevertheless, it is still worth mentioning, as it shows 
a problem: despite these zones being considered a huge opportunity for the 
developing Zambian economy, they still lack local participation. This situation 
has been caused by the attitude of the Zambian government, which only 
preferred Chinese investments in the zones since the beginning of their 
construction. Paradoxically, it was then the Chinese government persuaded the 
Zambian authorities to open the zones to other investors, not only to the 
Chinese ones.70  
                                                 
68  By 2015, there were three Chinese SEZs in operation (Zambia, Egypt, Ethiopia) and four 
more were still under construction. Carol Newman and John M. Page, “Industrial clusters: 
The case for Special Economic Zones in Africa”, no. 2017/15, WIDER Working Paper, 
2017, p. 20.  
69  Brautigam and Xioyang explain financing of the zones as involvement of three parties: 
Chinese developers, African governments and the Chinese government, where the 
Chinese enterprises are the primary actors in the development stage. African governments 
sometimes partner the Chinese firms but they do not play a direct role in developing the 
pilot projects. The Chinese government provides various forms of support (e.g. financial 
funding through loans and grants, material and networking support) to the Chinese 
companies initiating these projects and who won the official tenders (Deborah Bräutigam 
and Tang Xiaoyang, “African Shenzhen: China’s special economic zones in Africa”, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 49: 1, 2011, pp. 27-54). 
70
  “Zambia, China to sign a Tax Free Zone Deal”, in The Lusaka Times, 5 March 2008, 
www.lusakatimes.com/2008/03/05/zambia-china-to-sign-a-tax-free-zone-deal/ (accessed 
25 October 2017). 
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Similarly, Christina Alves (2011)71 mentions the obstacles for local 
participation. What became the most serious issue was the lack of a regulatory 
framework that would lead to the necessary acquisition of technology and 
know-how and to the integration of domestic investors. It turned out, for 
example, to be difficult for the domestic entrepreneurs to meet the requirements, 
allowing them to provide investments in the zone reaching at least 500,000 
USD. Another problem lies in the absence of regulations that would make 
investors use local resources needed for their activities. Consequently, under 
such circumstances, the Chinese investors managed to secure cheap material 
supplies from China.72  
Based on the experience with the Zambian government’s attitude towards 
participation of local investors in the SEZs, it can be stated that its support is 
rather low. And although the SEZs are considered to be a huge opportunity to 
develop local businesses, this opportunity is undermined by the lack of 
commitment to create an environment that would support it. The case of the 
SEZs in Zambia can illustrate a broader problem related to the will and interest 
of the Zambian government to negotiate such deals of ODF-like projects, ones 
that would result in a greater participation of local firms that otherwise remain 





The development finance provided by the PRC to Zambia in the period 
under review includes the entire territory of the state. However, as can be clear 
from the maps, the projects were primarily concentrated in the areas of mining 
activities, in the Copperbelt Province (Figure 2) and Lusaka Province which are 
areas the least affected by poverty (Figure 3). This concentration is further 
emphasized when the data are reduced to the social infrastructure projects and 
to population density in Zambia, showing the same trend in allocation into the 
regions that are the most densely populated (Figure 4).73 
 
 
                                                 
71  Ana Cristina Alves, “The Zambia–China Cooperation Zone at a Crossroads: What 
Now?”, Policy Briefing 41, SAIIA, 2011, www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/191-the-
zambia-china-cooperation-zone-at-a-crossroads-what-now (accessed 12 November 2017). 
72  Ibidem, p. 4. 
73  The same geographical bias is also discussed in the case of the regional concentration of 
investments and migration from China (see e.g. Padraig Carmody and Godfrey 
Hampwaye, “Inclusive or Exclusive Globalization?: Zambia's Economy and Asian 
Investment”, Africa Today 56: 3, 2010, pp. 84-102. 
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Figure 2: Allocation of the ODF-like projects according to distribution of minerals in Zambia 
(2000 – 2014)74 
 
 
Figure 3: Allocation of the ODF-like projects according to poverty by region in Zambia (2000 – 
2014)75 
                                                 
74  Map created based on the data provided by AidData. The number “43” in the middle of 
the map indicates projects that cannot be related to a specific location due to a lack of 
information on their geographical distribution or their nature for which they cannot be 
related to a specific area (e.g., debt relief). Source: AidData available at: 
http://china.aiddata.org/geospatial_ dashboard. 
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Figure 4: Allocation of the ODF-like projects in social infrastructure sector with regard to 
population density in Zambia (2000 – 2014)76 
 
Regardless of this regional concentration, there are a number of projects 
supporting the social development principle. The support includes the frequent 
expert assistance in the health sector and in the sector of education, providing 
Zambian students with scholarships, and construction and reconstruction of 
schools, university buildings and hospitals, that are projects that have been 
mentioned within the previous principle.77 Improvement of the living conditions 
of the Zambians was also the purpose of a 10 million USD grant aimed at 
                                                                                                                       
75  Ibid.  
76  The number “9” in the middle of the map indicates projects that cannot be related to a 
specific location due to a lack of information on their geographical distribution or their 
nature for which they cannot be related to a specific area (e.g., debt relief). Source: 
AidData available at: http://china.aiddata.org/geospatial_ dashboard. 
77
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Chinese Ambassador hands over the Lusaka 
General Hospital to Zambia”, 2011, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_ 
665342/zwbd_665378/t847390.shtml (accessed 26 November 2017) and “China commits 
$90 million to Levy Mwanawasa Hospital Expansion”, in The Lusaka Times, 31 March 
2015, www.lusakatimes.com/2015/03/31/china-commits-90-million-to-levy-mwanawasa-
hospital-expansion/ (accessed 26 November 2017). 
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enhancing the water supplies in Lusaka and other cities in 2006.78 In 2014, 
China likewise provided support to the Early Childhood Development Center, 
where educational material and equipment was delivered and the access to clean 
water was improved in the facility.79  
A relatively controversial project delivered by China concerns several 
mobile hospitals. In 2011, Beijing supplied Zambia with nine cars constructed 
as mobile medical facilities. This was the first project of its kind financed by a 
Chinese loan, and it was assumed that if it became successful, it would be 
implemented in other African countries as well. By 2012, these mobile facilities 
provided healthcare to 175,000 people in the country.80 The main purpose of the 
projects was to provide healthcare even in remote areas in Zambia where the 
access to medical facilities is otherwise limited. In this regard, the aim of the 
initiative certainly adheres to the stated principle. However, the project has also 
led to a wave of criticism, as it cost 53 million USD, and it is estimated that this 
amount will be repaid by the Zambian government no sooner than in 40 years. 
Apart from this, the project was also struggling with a lack of qualified staff for 
the facilities as well as equipment.81 Moreover, considering the quality of 
Zambian roads, it is expected that the vehicles will not be able to function for a 
long time, and therefore it would have been more reasonable to invest in the 
construction of permanent medical facilities. Some criticism also targeted the 
absence of consultations between the parliament and president Banda, 
suggesting that the initiative could have been just a strategy of the president to 
buy some votes in rural areas before elections.82  
In the sector of communication, projects that have a potential to reach 
remote areas of the country can be also mentioned. The most financially 
demanding project in this sector was implemented in 2010 and included the 
delivery of 5,300 km of optical network linking the rural areas of the country 
and the neighboring states of Namibia and Tanzania. In 2013, the project was 
                                                 
78
  “China-Zambia ties cemented through assistance, investment”, in Xinhuanet, 2 March 
2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/03/content_5690521.htm (accessed 26 
November 2017). 
79  Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Zambia, “Remarks at the Handover Ceremony of 
China's Assistance to the Ng'ombe ECD Center”, 2014, http://zm.chineseembassy.org/ 
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further expanded to 6,300 km. Its aim is to improve the efficiency and reliability 
of the nationwide power network management.83  
Among other projects supporting the principle of social development, it is 
possible to mention the construction of sport facilities. In 2010, the PRC 
provided a grant of 10 million USD for the Levy Mwanawasa Stadium 
construction in the Copperbelt Province in Ndola.84 Two stadiums (the Heroes 
National Stadium and the Independence Stadium), both in Lusaka, were also 
built with China’s assistance.85 During their construction, however, it was 
possible to notice some criticism from the Zambian Minister of Labour, as 
construction deficiencies had been discovered before the stadiums were opened 
to public. This criticism concerned emerging cracks in walls and poorly 
accessible emergency exit routes that were marked in the Chinese language.86  
In addition to the above mentioned projects, it is also possible to come 
across financial flows that were by their very purpose aimed at poverty 
alleviation in Zambia. In 2011, the Chinese government provided over 14 
million USD that were supposed to be used in the fight against poverty, 
however, it was not specified what projects or initiatives were included.87 Similarly, 
in 2012, another loan was delivered for poverty reduction in the country.88  
A lot of initiatives financially supported by Beijing have the potential to 
back up the adherence of one of the principles indirectly. Between 2000 and 
2014, China has provided financial and material support for construction of 
several power plants in Zambia. The energy sector is the area of cooperation 
that includes the most financially demanding projects and the overall amount of 
finance reached almost 3 billion USD. The majority of projects has been 
delivered to regions south from Lusaka, where a lot of attention has been paid to 
the Kafue Gorge Hydro Power Plant that was supported by Beijing financially 
and materially in order to expand the facility to meet the growing demand for 
                                                 
83
  “Zesco Launches Fibre Project Phase Two Extension”, in Biztech Africa, 22 February 2013, 
www.biztechafrica.com/article/zesco-launches-fibre-project-phase-two-extension/5374/ 
#.VUZMcSHtmko (accessed 26 November 2017). 
84
  “Zambia Gets 1 Billion Loan from China”, in The Lusaka Times, 3 November 2010, 
www.lusakatimes.com/2010/03/11/zambian-gets-1-billion-loan-from-china/ (accessed 26 
November 2017). 
85
  “New Independence Stadium construction to begin soon”, in The Lusaka Times, 27 
December 2010, www.lusakatimes.com/2010/12/27/independence-stadium-construction/ 
(accessed 26 November 2017). 
86
  “Heroes Stadium Not Ready Yet”, in Lusaka Voice, 2 July 2014, http://lusakavoice.com 
/2014/02/07/heroes-stadium-not-ready-yet/ (accessed 26 November 2017). 
87  Ellias Mbao, “China gives $14.7m to Zambia”, in Africa Review, 12 December 2011, 
www.africareview.com/News/China-comes-to-Zambias-aid/-/979180/1288166/-/12t6f8g/-
/index.html (accessed 26 November 2017). 
88  
“Former Finance Minister cautions government debt”, in Ukzambians, 1 January 2013, 
http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2013/01/01/former-finance-minister-cautions-government-
debt/ (accessed 26 November 2017). 
110  IVA SOJKOVÁ 







electricity in Zambia.89 Similarly, in 2007, the Chinese company Sino Hydro 
agreed to provide a loan to expand and upgrade the Kariba North Bank power 
station. 90 More recently, in 2014, the Zambian government signed a 41 million 
USD concessional loan for the construction of a 120 km transmission line 
between Kariba North Bank and Kafue West to boost the power output. The 
project was designed to transmit the additional electricity at the Kariba North 
Bank to the Lusaka power grid and consequently, it was expected that the 
population in Lusaka and beyond would have to deal with much fewer power 
cuts.91 In 2010, the construction of the Lunzua Power Station commenced to 
deliver power to the surrounding areas and due to its location in the eastern part 
of country, also to export electricity to the neighboring Tanzania.92 Besides the 
proclaimed endeavors to cover the Zambians’ growing demand for electricity, 
the mining interests of the Chinese investors can also explain this focus on 
power plants construction in Zambia. As reported in an article published in the 
Lusaka Times, the main purpose of the power plants projects was to deliver 
power to the mining companies operating in Zambia that consumed 40% of the 
total electricity generated per day.93 
Besides the geographical bias of projects allocation, the potential 
adherence to the social development principle of the PRC’s projects in Zambia 
is, as mentioned above, undermined by the fact that the contractors of the 
official development projects are mainly Chinese enterprises and Zambian 
companies are involved in the implementation only to a very small extent. At 
the same time, severe criticism also concerned the conditions prevailing at the 
working sites of some Chinese companies. However, it must be emphasized that 
such criticism was related to the Chinese activities that cannot be included 
among the ODF-like projects. These complaints, both domestic and 
international, mainly concerned the working conditions in the mining industry. 
Nevertheless, although categorized out of the ODF-like flows, these negatively 
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perceived activities had a significant impact even on China’s provision of its 





The observance of this principle through project implementation can be 
noticed only since 2014. In 2014, Beijing cooperated with the UNDP and the 
Danish government on implementation of a project with the purpose of 
increasing access to electricity for rural population through utilizing solar and 
wind energy. Considering the focus of the project on the use of renewable 
resources of energy, it indirectly supports other socio-economic and 
environmental objectives, such as poverty reduction and climate change-related 
activities and adaptation to it. 94 
The negative impact on the environment was not discussed in any of the 
ODF-like projects implemented by China. However, China’s mining activities 
led to some debate on the potential of environmentally negative impact of this 
kind of engagement. The concerns were related to the Chinese investments in 
mining, hydropower, roads, and smelters. Some local environmental NGOs 
accused the Chinese mining companies of serious pollution of air, water, and 
land, or damaging wildlife habitat and displacing local communities without 
adequate compensation.95 The situation has substantially improved in the recent 
years, which is given by constructive dialogues and steps taken by both the 
Zambian government and the Chinese investors. The Zambian government has 
introduced measures to strengthen the country’s environmental laws, thus since 
2007, it has been possible to observe some enhancement of the monitoring and 
enforcement capacity of the local environmental agencies through increased 
funding, revisited environmental regulations, promoted coordination among 
relevant agencies, and increased fines for polluters. Moreover, in 2011, Zambia 
Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA), the public body entrusted with 
the enforcement of local environmental regulations, was created. In 2015, the 
Mines and Mineral Development Act was introduced, forcing mining 
companies to become accountable to government and local communities for 
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their actions that affect the environment.96 With these regulations in place, the 
Zambian government has been able to suspend the mining operations of some 
Chinese companies, and others were forced to improve their environmental 





The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the recipient 
state and its observance cannot be considered adhered to in the case of Zambia. 
Its breach is linked to the politicization of activities of the Chinese investors, 
especially of mining enterprises, and the rise of anti-Chinese populism in the 
country since 2006.98 The wave of anti-Chinese populism was fuelled by 
frequent criticism of working conditions in the mines as well as series of 
accidents caused by safety failures on the working sites. 99 100 The negative 
perception of the Chinese engagement increased together with several incidents 
between the Chinese management and the Zambian workforce that resulted in 
threats, injuries and even death of several workers and managers in some 
mining facilities. 101 
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Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front (PF) based their campaigns on anti-
Chinese rhetoric fueled by growing negative sentiment towards the Chinese and 
their investments in the country. China was presented by Sata as exploitive 
power, bringing nothing good to Zambia. In 2007, Sata even claimed that the 
former colonial rule was better than the Chinese presence, as the British at least 
brought education and civilisation to the country.102 This very campaign and 
Sata’s xenophobic rhetoric threatening to expel the Chinese, Lebanese and 
Indian traders, and to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan, resulted in a 
warning from Beijing to cut diplomatic relations if Sata was elected as a 
president in the upcoming election.103 The provision of official development 
financing by Beijing was therefore conditioned by who the winner of the 2006 
election would be. Since Michael Sata did not win in 2006, and Levy 
Mwanawasa defended the presidential post, the diplomatic relations were not 
interrupted. After the 2006 election, Beijing forced the Chinese enterprises to 
ameliorate the working conditions and to start working on improving the overall 
perception of the Chinese in Zambia.  
Another possible breach of a principle was also discussed during the 
election in 2011. In that year, China was suspected of financially supporting the 
incumbent presidential candidate Rupiah Banda and his party the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD), whose opponent was again Sata. The suspicion 
was about the scale of the MMD campaign, subsequently raising questions 
about the funding sources, as the party's financing was too opaque. All the 
allegations were played down by MMD’s representatives, so the principle’s 
violation in this instance cannot be confirmed.104  
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Based on the above mentioned information, it can be said that the 
principle of non-interference was not adhered to in case of Zambia. It was 
clearly violated by the rhetoric on conditioning the Chinese finance with the 
results of the presidential election in 2006. Despite the debate that emerged on 
China’s interference also in the 2011 election, the 2006 instance remains the 
only clear case when such a violation was confirmed. Although such possible 
breach has also been discussed on other occasions in other countries in 
Africa,105 the Zambian case still remains the only officially acknowledged 





During the period under review, Beijing has provided 44 million USD to 
support the Zambian government and civil society sector through ODF-like 
financed projects.106 Among projects that supported this principle by their very 
purpose, it is possible to mention the construction of the Lusaka government 
complex in 2002, and then its expansion in 2009.107 The support of the sector 
focused especially on equipment delivery. Thus, in 2003, it was possible to 
trace transfer of materials and equipment to the police108 and the government.109 
In 2011, nine government cars were delivered for Banda’s administration. 
However, this project was perceived as a rather controversial one, since it was 
found that this material assistance for president’s cabinet was used by 
businessmen affiliated with the family members of Banda and their 
acquaintances.110 In relation to the controversies, Banda was later arrested and 
investigated for this misconduct in the office.111 Similarly, in 2012, China 
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donated 65 motor vehicles to the Zambian government.112 A year later, China 
provided the Zambian police with 25 new cars to improve its operations.113 In 
2006, Beijing donated a “batch of goods” to the Zambian government that was 
worth about 1.2 million USD to be used in the election later that year.114 
However, more specific information regarding this delivery is missing and 
considering the perception of China’s possible interests in the results of the 
election, its potential to support stability in Zambia can be questioned.  
Despite the presence of projects delivered within China’s ODF-like 
flows, China’s presence in Zambia can also be characterized with a number of 
destabilizing elements, as already discussed above. One of these stability 
undermining features became the growth of Zambia’s debt. From 2000 to 2014, 
Beijing provided more than 5.4 billion USD and from this amount, 400 million 
were in the form of debt relief. The largest amount was written off the country’s 
debt in 2006, immediately after Rupiah Banda, the incumbent pro-China 
candidate, won the presidential election.115 However, despite the substantial 
debt cancellation initiatives, it must be mentioned that out of all the ODF-like 
financial flows delivered by China, projects that have been provided in the form 
of a grant and thus without increasing Zambia’s debt burden only exceeded 300 
million USD. In other words, these grants together with debt relief actions 
accounted only for around 14% of the ODF-like finance, the majority of ODF-
like flows - the remaining 4.7 billion USD - is thus expected to be repaid by 
Zambia.116 The rapidly growing debt burden of the country has already come to 
the attention of the International Monetary Fund, which has been refusing to 
provide the Zambian government with further loans, worrying about its debt 
management and stable economic development.117 
Apart from the disturbingly growing debt, there were other features and 
activities potentially undercutting the adherence to the principle. The 
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persistently bad working conditions and violent resolving of these problems led 
to protests in the Chinese enterprises and to subsequent politicization of China’s 
engagement in the country since 2006. In this context, however, it has been 
questioned whether the Chinese presence in Zambia is really seen as negatively 
among the Zambians as it has been presented in the media, the speeches of 
politicians or in the reports of international organizations. Some experts dealing 
with the Chinese presence in Zambia disagree with such demonizing 
conclusions and draw attention to the shortcomings and biases in the data 
collection of these interpretations of China’s presence in Zambia and therefore 
also question its destabilizing influence. 
What is worth mentioning in this regard is the work of Gérard van Bracht 
(2012)118 and the series of articles written by Sautman and Hairong.119 All the 
studies strongly criticized the Human Rights Watch report published in 2011, 
which investigated bad working conditions in China’s enterprise China 
Nonferrous Metal Mining group (CNMC). Bracht presented a field research on 
the perception of China and the Chinese among the Zambians and came to the 
conclusion that it is incorrect to assume that, in general, the Zambians do not 
like China. In Zambia, the contribution of the Chinese and their companies was 
also appreciated and perceived positively by local societies, the view of the 
Chinese presented in media can be thus misleading.120 Bracht also concludes 
that the Zambians made the most positive associations with development 
finance China has delivered, especially its support of healthcare. Overall, 
Chinese projects were perceived as being particularly beneficial for creating 
new jobs. On the contrary, the most negative associations with the Chinese 
presence was related to the working conditions. In this regard, it referred to low 
wages and to physical abuse of workers and tragic incidents that occurred at the 
workplace. 121 Additionally, there appeared to be a substantial difference among 
the respondents, as the negative criticism came mainly from low-skilled and 
low-paid labour expressing lack of respect from the Chinese and reporting 
higher levels of threat coming from the Chinese presence. In contrast to this 
perception, better qualified and educated employees saw the situation 
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differently, rather beneficially, and even shared their employers’ views about 
paying lower wages to unqualified workers, which were in their opinion 
appropriate for their work and qualification.122 
The negative perception of China’s engagement contributed to instability 
in Zambia, as it led to the outbreak of post-election violence against the Chinese 
entrepreneurs in 2006123 and in 2007 to the cancellation of a planned visit of 
Chambishi by the Chinese president because of security risks.124 However, it 
became debatable what actually contributed to such an instability, if it was the 
real negative influence and impact of the Chinese engagement, or the way it was 
presented and exaggerated in the media and in Sata’s campaign. Sautman and 
Hairong pointed out that working conditions in the Chinese working sites were 
not significantly worse compared to other foreign investors underlining 
substantial weaknesses of the above-mentioned Human Rights Watch report 
published on working conditions in China’s run CNMC referring to it as the 
“the biggest violator of workers’ rights among Zambian copper industry 
employers.”125 According to these researchers, the report is biased and with 
methodological deficiencies and consequently it says more about the Human 
Rights Watch policy agenda than about the Chinese activities in Africa. By 
comparing China and other investors in the mining sector in Zambia, they 
questioned the claims of this report and concluded that the security situation at 
the Chinese investors’ workplaces was not worse than elsewhere. Salary 
conditions have not only improved considerably in the CNMC run enterprises, 
but the differences in salaries of laborers were basically non-existent.126 
                                                 
122  Ibidem, pp. 79. 
123  David Blair, “Rioters Attack Chinese after Zambian Poll”, in The Telegraph, 3 October 
2006, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1530464/Rioters-attack-Chinese-after-
Zambian-poll.html (accessed 18 December 2017). 
124
  “China Launches Mining Program in Zambia”, in The Lusaka Times, 2 May 2007, 
www.lusakatimes.com/2007/02/05/china-launches-mining-program-in-zambia/ (accessed 
18 December 2017). 
125  Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse” Labor Abuses in Zambia’s 
Chinese State-owned Copper Mines, 2011, pp. 22, www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
126  Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “The beginning of a world empire?...cit.”, pp. 137-149. 
Regarding the wage gap differences between CNMC and other foreign mining firms in 
Zambia, Sautman and Hairong offer other important and Zambia-specific explanation for 
such a situation. For example, when purchased, the CNMC mine in Chambishi had to 
undergo a costly rehabilitation because it had not been in operation for 13 years and was 
flooded. There are also differences in mining modalities among investors in Zambia. In 
this regard, Chinese CNMC operates in deep underground mines, with lower copper 
content and at the same time the mine is labour-intensive, consequently leading to lower 
earnings. Another issue is the fact that unlike other investors, the Chinese ones kept 
investing in Zambia during the financial crisis and China’s CNMC also committed itself 
to the so-called “three nots”: not to reduce investment, not to cut down on production and 
not to lay off workers. Moreover, in addition to the HRW’s reference to China as a “bad 
118  IVA SOJKOVÁ 







Additionally, such conclusions and criticism towards the Human Rights Watch 
bias were also shared in the statements of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ), similarly rejecting to single out the Chinese run enterprises as the worst 





The aim of the article was to examine the observance of the Beijing 
Consensus principles in the case of Zambia in the time period of 2000 – 2014. It 
can be concluded that when limited to the purpose of delivered finance and 
projects, all the principles were adhered to except for the non-interference 
principle. This principle was clearly breached at least once during the 2006 
election by conditioning China’s future engagement in the country, and thus 
also its development finance delivery, with the winner of the election. 
Moreover, adherence to other principles was at the same time undermined by 
the process of their implementation and allocation. At certain times, their 
quality and price were also questioned, and similarly, some by-product activities 
and interests in the country not directly related to China’s ODF-like flows also 
substantially contributed to these undercutting features.  
In the case of the innovation-led development principle, its adherence was 
undermined by a lack of knowledge transfer element in the Chinese 
development initiatives unless these initiatives were focused on the support of 
this area directly. It was also further undercut by the absence of local enterprises 
participating in the implementation of Beijing’s funded development projects. 
Similarly, the social development principle was undercut by a strong 
geographical bias in the projects’ allocation throughout the country, thus, the 
majority of initiatives financed by Beijing was supporting Chinese investments 
and not reaching the poorest areas in Zambia. Moreover, this bias is also evident 
when the overall ODF-like flows are reduced to the projects implemented in the 
social infrastructure sector. This principle was also challenged by some by-
product activities and their negative impact on living conditions in Zambia, 
                                                                                                                       
employer”, when the Swiss company closed its Luanshya mine at the time of the crisis, it 
was the Chinese CNMC that bought it and re-hired its employees and employed hundreds 
more. Similarly, when the nickel mining firm Albidon Ltd., with the Chinese enterprise 
owning 51% of its shares, indefinitely suspended operations due to a decline in nickel 
prices and technical problems, it continued to pay full salaries to its 2,000 employees 
despite the difficulties it was facing (Barry SAUTMAN, Yan HAIRONG, “Barking Up 
the Wrong…”). 
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such as - for instance - the broadly criticised working conditions and violent 
incidents in Chinese mining facilities.  
The principle of sustainable development and its adherence was 
supported only by one project co-implemented by China in 2014. Again, more 
attention regarding this principle was paid to the Chinese mining activities and 
their harmful impact on the environment. The extent to which China supports 
the principle adherence through its ODF-like projects also demonstrates that the 
support of the principles differs substantially.  
The principle of stability can also be considered adhered to when limited 
to the purpose of the projects provided into areas directly supporting steady 
environment. In this case, however, there were also some projects and initiatives 
which could be considered to be weakening the principle’s adherence. Some 
projects delivered by Beijing were perceived as supporting the government 
during elections and consequently led to criticism of China’s influence on 
Zambian politics in order to pursue its own interests rather than sustaining 
stability in the country. Likewise, due to increasing financial flows provided by 
China, the Zambian debt has increased substantially since 2000, as only a small 
part of the finance has been delivered as a grant. The debt burden has already 
led to the worries of the international financial institutions about its possible 
impact on Zambia’s economy. Additionally, even in this case, there were some 
not ODF-like flows related elements of China’s engagement that have 
contributed to serious weakening of the security situation in Zambia through the 
increase of protests and violent attacks on Chinese citizens. However, it can be 
discussed to what extent the protests and anti-Chinese sentiment among the 
Zambians were caused by characteristics of China’s engagement or by the way 
they were presented in the media and in the campaign of Michael Sata.  
What does the Zambian case examined in this paper tell us about the 
Beijing Consensus? 
Although the principles based on Ramos’s concept are applicable and 
their adherence is traceable in Zambia, the case also shows us the limits of 
development potential of China’s development financing and its own 
development experience. Indeed, as some critiques of the concept put it, some 
of the principles of the model should be perceived as something that Beijing 
wants its development strategy to achieve in the future. In this respect, also the 
Zambian case shows us that the Beijing Consensus remains in many regards an 
aspiration rather than today’s reality. This is mainly evident from the 
differences of the attention paid to particular principles through ODF-like 
projects delivery, as for instance within the principle of sustainable 
development, only one project has been delivered in 15 years. Likewise, the 
equality of the development can be at least questioned due to a strong 
geographical bias of the projects’ allocation favouring two regions over the rest 
of the country. Moreover, the case underlines that together with some 
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development supporting characteristics stemming from China’s model of 
development, other specifics of the development experience also emerge, ones 
that might be undermining unless they are addressed and regulated by the 
recipient. The principles of innovation-led development and social development 
emphasized the limited interest in securing more benefits from the financing 
delivered through adopting regulations and negotiating agreements that would 
have allowed for a greater inclusion and participation of the local businesses 
and their subsequent development. This disinterest seems to come from both 
sides. At the same time, however, it can be stated that the negative impact of 
China’s presence, whether real or invented by the media and politicians, can 
force the recipient to adopt some important regulations in certain areas (e.g. 
mining sector, protection of environment) that otherwise would not be adopted, 
or, at least, not that quickly and to such an extent. In this regard, it is important 
to underline that the Beijing Consensus, unlike the Washington Consensus, is a 
passive model and thus it does not force the recipient to adopt some policies to 
reach the loans and grants, although in Zambia, this approach was once 
breached. As an implication of this opportunity, there is more space to 
maneuver for the recipient and consequently also more responsibility to take 
when negotiating agreements, so they would benefit recipient’s own citizens 
and development agenda. Therefore, it is more than ever up to recipients’ 
governments to make use of these ties to meet their own development goals. 
However, to fully understand the true alternativeness the model is bringing to 
the African continent, more cases and comparisons to traditional donor’s 
financial flows are needed in the future research. 
 
